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Carbon Capitalism
WITH CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS: ESTABLISHING AN EMISSIONS TRADING SCHEME IN CHINA

THOMAS LEE

“Popular grassroots activism a is major
driving force pushing the largest emitter
on the planet to take concrete climate
action.”

W

hen discussing energy policy for mitigating global climate change, China is the single most important country to examine. It has been the largest national emitter
of greenhouse gases since 2007, accounting for almost 30% of
global emissions,1 and is projected to contribute more than half
of the increase in world emissions. 2 Even on a per capita basis, the
most populous nation emits 7.2 tons of carbon dioxide per person,
exceeding the world average of 5.1 tons and the EU’s 6.8 tons3. In
response, China is taking significant steps of leadership on climate action: the government has pledged significant mitigation
targets, while setting realistic plans to implement these targets
through its proposed national cap-and-trade system.
Following a series of local pilot programs, China’s National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) announced on August 31,
2014 to establish a national carbon emissions trading scheme that
aims to be operational by 2016 4. On December 10, 2014, the NDRC
officially released its “Interim Regulatory Measures for Carbon
1 International Energy Agency. (2014). CO2 Emissions from Fuel Combustion Highlights. Retrieved from https://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/
CO2EmissionsFromFuelCombustionHighlights2014.pdf
2 U.S. Energy Information Administration. (2011, March 31). Emissions of Greenhouse Gases in the U.S. Retrieved from http://www.eia.gov/environment/emissions/
ghg_report/ghg_overview.cfm
3 Global Carbon Project. (2011). Global Carbon Budget. http://www.globalcarbonproject.org/carbonbudget/14/hl-full.htm#regionalFF
4 Chen, K. & Reklev, S. (2014, August 31). China’s carbon market to start in 2016 - official. Retrieved from http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/08/31/china-carbontrading-idUSL3N0R107420140831
5 People’s Republic of China National Development and Reform Commission. (2014,
December 10) Number 17 - Interim Regulatory Measures for Carbon Emissions Trading. Retrieved from http://qhs.ndrc.gov.cn/zcfg/201412/t20141212_652007.html

Emissions Trading” for further policy development5. If successfully designed and executed, a Chinese cap-and-trade strategy represents a crucial victory for economists as well as the planet.

Mitigation Commitements
The large potential for China’s climate policies stem from a context
of rapid economic development and reliance on fossil fuels. From
2000 until 2011, China experienced an annual real GDP growth of
10% on average6. Although GDP growth has slowed from reduced
industrial production and exports due to counter-inf lation policies, the current leadership under President Xi and Premier Li is
still focused on long-term and sustainable growth, particularly
with an economy driven by greater domestic consumption. The
persistence of poverty and inequality between regions means
that economic development will remain a priority.
How will this growth be powered? Currently, the vast majority of
the Chinese energy mix is fossil fuels with about 70% from coal,
by consumption7. Energy itself constitutes the largest piece of the
overall emissions mix. Within energy, the power sector (40%),
manufacturing sector (23%), and other industrial processes (12%)
are the three largest contributors to China’s emissions.
Oil: 18%
Hydropower: 6%
Natural Gas: 4%

Coal: 70%
of China’s Energy Mix

figure 1 Visual repNuclear & Other
Renewables: 2%

resentation of China’s
energy mix.

International Energy Agency. (2014). CO2 Emissions from Fuel Combustion Highlights. Retrieved from https://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/
CO2EmissionsFromFuelCombustionHighlights2014.pdf
7
Ibid
6
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Industrial Processes: 11.85%
(1,255.72 MtCO2)

Manufacturing &
Construction: 23.47%
(2,487.49 MtCO2)
Electricity/Heat: 40.25%
(4,266.04 MtCO2)
of China’s Emissions

Other Fuel Combustion: 6.70%
(710.35 MtCO2)
Agriculture: 6.68%
(708.19 MtCO2)
Transportation: 5.88%
(623.32 MtCO2)
Fugitive Emissions: 2.88%
(304.81 MtCO2)
Waste: 1.86%
(196.68 MtCO2)
Bunker Fuels: 0.45%
(47.57 MtCO2)

figure 2 Visual representation of China’s Emissions by Sector (Excluding Land Use Change & Forestry) - 2011
In addition to international pressure for stronger climate change
mitigation efforts, the government leadership faces mounting
pressure from masses of grassroots environmental protests. In
2013, the Ministry of Environmental Protection cited 712 cases of
“abrupt environmental incidents” — an official term for environmentally-inspired protests — a 31% jump from the previous year.
From the perspective of regime legitimacy, China must contend
with how its energy system leads to local environmental health
impacts through associated unrest, regardless of international
climate change. As a result of this citizen activism, the energy
policy choices are about more than just environmental conservation, but about public health - especially respiratory health impacts to local communities due to fossil fuel and manufacturing
pollution such as particulate matter. The official policy terminology is shifting towards becoming a “harmonious society” that
might sacrifice GDP growth for better environmental protection8.
Popular grassroots activism is a major driving force pushing the
largest emitter on the planet to take concrete climate action - every individual who participated in these 712 “incidents” helped
push the central and local governments towards re-prioritizing
people and the planet over pure profits.

“Any policy proposals that ignore the
market-based approach are inherently
prone to these downsides of cost-ineffectiveness.”
Governmental commitment to climate action is not uncharted
territory: the PRC’s 11th Five Year Plan (2006–2010) successfully
reduced energy intensity and increased the renewables energy
share according to target. Within this context, the Chinese government’s 12th Five Year Plan establishes these targets by 2020: 1)
reduce carbon intensity (emissions per unit of GDP) by 40% to 45%
compared to 2005 levels, and 2) increase the renewables’ share to
15%9. Critics often prefer an absolute emissions reduction target
as opposed to the carbon intensity goal. At the same time, the US
EPA’s proposed Clean Power Plan uses this same approach via
Leggett, J. (2011, July 18). China’s Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Mitigation Policies.
Congressional Research Service. Retrieved from
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/169172.pdf
9
Ibid
8
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energy efficiency targets. Moreover, China’s 2020 targets represent real amounts of emissions abatement compared to the business-as-usual scenario: the total abatement from 2011 to 2020 is
estimated to be 33 gigatons of carbon dioxide equivalent10.

Emissions Economics
In order to meet these emission reduction commitments as well
as long-term sustainability goals, the government faces a choice
between what environmental economists classify as “command-and-control” mandates and market-based policies that seek
to price in environmental externalities. From the perspective of
microeconomic theory, an emissions allowance trading scheme
can be the most cost-effective method of dealing with global carbon pollution.
China has had certain success with its command-and-control,
which “focuses on regulating the behaviour or performance of individual factories and power plants”.11 For example, the national
government launched the Top 1000 Enterprises Energy Conservation Action Program in April 2006, which assigned energy efficiency mandates for industrial enterprises; by the end of 2008
the program had saved 106 million tons of CO2 equivalent (tce)
emissions (2 years ahead of schedule). For its 12th five-year plan
(2011-2015), the central government expanded this program to the
Top 10,000 Enterprises Energy Conservation Low Carbon Action
Program; through its first year of operation the program already
achieved 69% of its 250 million tce goal12 for the whole five-year
period.13
However, there are substantial theoretical reasons to prefer a
market-based approach. Whether framed as negative externalities or a Tragedy of the Commons, activities that emit greenhouse
gases exemplify negative externalities. For example, a company
manufactures cement to gain a profit while releasing carbon dioxide into the atmosphere; these additional gases exacerbate cliErnst & Young. (2015, March 1). Understanding China’s Emissions Trading Schemes
and Emissions Reporting. Retrieved from
www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/EY-Understanding_Chinas_Emissions_
Trading_Schemes_and_Emissions_Reporting/$FILE/EY-Understanding-Chinas-ETS-and-Emissions-Reporting.pdf
11
Keohane, N. & Olmstead, S. (2007) Markets and the Environment. Island Press. 143.
12
Chen, K. & Reklev, S. (2014, August 31). China’s carbon market to start in 2016 official. Retrieved from http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/08/31/china-carbontrading-idUSL3N0R107420140831
13
Zhang, Z. (2014, June). Nota di Lavoro. Fondazione Eni Erico Mattei. Retrieved from
http://www.feem.it/userfiles/attach/2014711543244NDL2014-060.pdf
10

mate change and lead to additional environmental harms, that
are spread across the global society rather than remaining borne
by the originator company.
How should this public goods problem be resolved? As first introduced by English economist Arthur Pigou in 1920 in The Economics of Welfare, levying a price exactly equal to the social cost of this
externality would completely eliminate economic deadweight
loss - the dreaded triangle of lost social welfare that remains unrecoverable to either consumers or producers. By virtue of supply and demand, a market-based pollution policy must result in
the utilization of the least-cost resources on society’s marginal
abatement curve while minimizing the opportunity cost (which
includes anything from private consumption to infrastructure
investment). On the other hand, any government pursuing command-and-control has no such guarantee. The reason is simply
that humans are fallible: an agency might not exactly estimate the
costs of different abatement technologies and end up choosing the
relatively more expensive ones as part of the set of pollution solutions. Moreover, these costs may f luctuate over time or change
depending on which firm is implementing the technology change.
This presents a problem because in order to achieve “cost-effective allocation of abatement… the last unit of pollution control
done by every firm must cost the same amount” - otherwise “there
would be a way to reallocate abatement at lower cost.”14 So even
if a non-market approach achieves some laudable abatement target, the market-based version can achieve the same level at lower
opportunity costs. Furthermore, even if they are not explicitly
labeled with the not-so-f lattering name “command-and-control”,
any policy proposals that ignore the market-based approach - like
China’s “Top 1,000” or “Top 10,000” policies - are inherently prone
to these cost-ineffectiveness downsides.
The Coase Theorem, introduced by the Nobel laureate Ronald
Coase in 1960 in The Problem of Social Cost, formalizes the foundation for pollution trading, by showing that allocating property
rights for pollution allows for private bargaining and transfer payments that lead to the same cost-effective social welfare solution,
14

Keohane, N. & Olmstead, S. (2007) Markets and the Environment. Island Press. 143.

without having to set a universal pollution price. In the context of
carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases, individual firms that
emit pollution can pay for the right to pollute. According to the
Stockholm Environment Institute (SEI), the main reason that China is considering market-based approaches is that the currently
used “command and control measures to reduce emissions” like
“closing down coal plants by fiat” are “less efficient than a market
based trading system.”15
Whether implemented through cap-and-trade or a carbon tax, using the market-based mechanism of a carbon price should achieve
the same level of pollution abatement. However, there are important theoretical differences. Since the exact future energy supply
and demand functions cannot be perfectly forecasted, a fixed carbon price level leads to uncertainty in the actualized level of abatement if there are unexpected demand shocks or technological
shifts. For example, if Chinese oil production suddenly becomes
cheaper or if electricity demand exceeds forecasts, then a given
carbon price level would lead to more emissions than intended –
causing an overrun in the overall target. This can pose a particular challenge for China, which is still experiencing rapid growth
in energy demand accompanied by its strong (albeit stabilizing)
economic development. Conversely, the uncertainty of market
conditions means that setting a fixed carbon cap level leads to
uncertainty in the resulting carbon price level. Given China’s
massive pressures to actualize its ambitious mitigation targets,
an uncertain abatement level from a carbon tax is less preferable
than a cap-and-trade system, which may employ price control to
stabilize prices within a desired range. Keohane summarizes the
difference between a carbon tax for which “the regulator must
know the aggregate MAC curve in order to attain a particular
level of abatement with an emissions tax” versus a cap-and-trade
system which “determines the quantity of pollution directly” and
requires “no other information than the policy target”. Analytically, simulations have found a hybrid system of a cap with price
Han, G., Olsson, M. Hallding, K., & Lunsford, D. (2012). China’s Carbon Emission
Trading: An Overview of Current Development. Stockholm Environment Institute.
Retrieved from http://www.sei-international.org/mediamanager/documents/Publications/china-cluster/SEI-FORES-2012-China-Carbon-Emissions.pdf
15

Demonsrators in
Kunming protest the
sit ing of a paraxlyene
(PX) petrochemical
plant.
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Ronald Coase provided the theoret ical foundat ions for emissions trading

“Once launched, China’s national trading scheme will become the single largest emissions market by cap size.”
nalized. The legal and administrative infrastructure for taxation
already exists in China. In practice, there are many policy design
considerations that complicate the theoretical elegance of an “ideal” emissions trading system, including cap size, industry coverage, and initial permit allocation.

Regional to National
In order to determine how to approach these nuances, the Chinese government has initiated seven regional pilot programs: in
Shenzhen, Shanghai, Beijing, Guangdong, Tianjin, Hubei, and
Chongqing. The success of a comprehensive national emissions
trading scheme hinges on the experiences with these pilots; lessons learned should be applied to the national implementation.
Amidst drastically different policy designs, these seven pilots
share some major characteristics. Each one has about 40 to 60%
coverage of the jurisdiction’s overall emissions: their coverage of
emitters includes the power and heavy industry (e.g. steel, cement,
and petrochemical) sectors, as well as large electricity end-users18.
For each of the pilots, the initial permit allocation starts off as
mostly free permits, mostly through grandfathering of historical
benchmark emissions.19

range controls can lead to higher economic efficiency that a pure
tax16. This may partially explain the central government’s strong
interest in exploring ETS options.
An additional advantage of a cap-and-trade scheme over a carbon
tax is the inherent uncertainty in estimating the social cost of carbon. To implement an efficient carbon price, it is necessary to use
some integrated climate-economy model to project future damages from climate change and obtain a discounted present value of
a marginal unit of carbon pollution17. For example, policymakers
may utilize economist William Nordhaus’s Dynamic Integrated
model of Climate and the Economy (DICE). This social cost then
informs what the economically efficient abatement level is globally or regionally. However, in practice, a national government faces many other pressures and stakeholders, such as international
climate negotiation and domestic grassroots protests, which can
impact the ability to implement an efficient solution. These other
equity and political factors are exogenous to any models computing the social cost of carbon. In the case of cap-and-trade policies,
governments are able to a priori determine the desirable level of
abatement, and the market price will follow through according to
supply and demand. This ability for a cap-and-trade system to bypass any limitations and inaccuracies in social carbon cost models represents another theoretical advantage of an ETS.
Of course, a main benefit of a carbon tax is that it is much easier
to implement since there are fewer administrative complexities,
once a carbon price level is decided and industry coverage is fiPizer, W. (1997, October). Prices vs. Quantities Revised: The Case of Climate Change.
Resources for the Future. Retrieved from http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.474.2521&rep=rep1&type=pdf
17
In other words, the incremental amount of environmental cost we would attach
16
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The biggest policy design challenge for both the pilots and the
eventual national system is the current regulatory backwardness of China’s electricity system. Compared to other countries’
restructured electricity markets (as in Europe or most American
states like California) where market mechanisms determine the
prices for both wholesale and retail markets, China’s power sector
is heavily regulated. Retail electricity prices in China are strictly regulated by NDRC, with infrequent retail price adjustments,
meaning generators cannot easily pass on increased carbon costs
to end consumers20. Moreover, China’s electrical dispatch system
uses an “equal capacity factor” approach – meaning the grid operator tries to use electricity from all generation plants at roughly
equal capacity utilizations in order to assist capital cost recovery
– as opposed to “economic dispatch” which maintains a merit
order in order to minimize marginal costs at the moment 21. This
implies that the carbon price would not fully translate to higher-emissions generators being used less and vice versa, since the
dispatch remains impervious to marginal cost.
To address the power sector problem, the Chinese government
(or NDRC as a policy designer) can try to reform the electricity
market to fit an ETS or vice versa. Within the theme of China’s
recent institutional reforms, restructuring the electricity market
Song, R. & Lei, H. (2014, January 24). Emissions Trading in China: First Reports
from the Field. World Resources Institute. Retrieved from http://www.wri.org/
blog/2014/01/emissions-trading-china-first-reports-field
19
Jotzo, F. (n.d.). Emissions Trading in China: Principles, Design Options and Lessons
from International Practice. Ideas. Retrieved April 5 from https://ideas.repec.org/p/
een/ccepwp/1303.html
20
Teng, F., Wang, X., & Zhiqiang, L. (2014, December). Introducing the emissions trading system to China’s electricity sector: Challenges and opportunities. Energy Policy,
75, 39-45. doi:10.1016/j.enpol.2014.08.010
21
RAP. (2013, October). Recommendations for Power Sector Policy in China: Practical
Solutions for Energy, Climate, and Air Quality. Retrieved from www.raponline.org/
document/download/id/6869
18

Map of market-based climate policies
around the world. Australia’s ETS was
abolished in 2014 by the Abbott administrat ion.

for pricing mechanisms and merit dispatch is hugely beneficial
for overall economic welfare. While there have been local pilots
for this “deregulation”, comprehensive restructuring probably
will occur in the longer term compared to the urgency of China’s
carbon mitigation needs. Thus, there are efficient workarounds
within an ETS that are already being tested through the Chinese
pilot programs. Specifically, the pilots deliberately cover both
electric generators as well end consumers for the embedded emissions in their electric consumption. Rather than “double-counting” emissions, this method of demand-side carbon pricing helps
to efficiently achieve the desired amount of carbon abatement 22.
An example of a successful demand-side carbon policy is Tokyo’s
municipal ETS launched in 201023. Of course, there is a tradeoff of
more transaction costs due to the larger number of downstream
consumers - something that can be resolved with comprehensive
power sector reform.
There are other policy design concerns, including setting a cap
size that is stringent enough to avoid a price collapse as happened
in the EU ETS or the Northeast’s Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI). Some of the pilots are already experimenting with
market stability reserves similar to the one currently being proposed for the EU system 24. Furthermore, once the national system is launched, the central authorities must establish a strong
legal enforcement infrastructure at all local government levels
to ensure compliance, especially because these regional pilots are
so different. With lessons learned from the pilot programs, the
NDRC and other central agencies all well poised to design an effective carbon trading mechanism.

Going Out
In the spirit of China’s Go Out Policy for increasing business
investment overseas, there are large benefits from extending
China’s ETS to the international realm. Fundamentally, the theoretical underpinning of cap-and-trade’s effectiveness is that
it allows society to take advantage of heterogeneous abatement
costs across different firms. In the same way that global free trade
Jotzo, F. (n.d.). Emissions Trading in China: Principles, Design Options and Lessons
from International Practice. Ideas. Retrieved April 5 from https://ideas.repec.org/p/
een/ccepwp/1303.html
23
Bureau of the Environment. Tokyo Metropolitan Government. (2010, March). Tokyo-Cap-and-Trade Program: Japan’s first mandatory emissions trading scheme. Retrieved from https://www.kankyo.metro.tokyo.jp/en/attachement/Tokyo-cap_and_
trade_program-march_2010_TMG.pdf
24
European Commission. (2014). Proposal for a Decision of the European Parliament
and of the Council. Retrieved from http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/reform/
docs/com_2014_20_en.pdf
22

without protectionism makes everybody better off (at least in the
scheme of microeconomics) by encouraging production according to comparative advantages, a global emissions trading system
has the potential to make use of different countries’ comparative
carbon abatement abilities. More international coverage means
more economic welfare. From an operational standpoint, a larger volume of carbon permits also means more trading liquidity
and hence a better realization of the theoretically correct price
of carbon.
Once launched, China’s national trading scheme will become the
single largest emissions market by cap size, surpassing the EU
ETS. However, it will not only contribute to global carbon-economic efficiency by sheer size alone, it also has the potential to
serve as a platform to link other regional cap-and-trade systems
and thus improve cost-effectiveness and market liquidity. The
government proposal includes plans to for the Chinese system to
become a hub for other national emissions markets in Asia-Pacific, such as those in New Zealand (launched 2008), Kazakhstan
(launched 2013), and South Korea (launched 2015)25. Other countries in the region, including Indonesia, Thailand, and Vietnam,
are also deliberating emissions trading policies.
From the perspective of the global climate system, national
boundaries are arbitrary and their existence will not prevent
the laws of physics to act on the ever-increasing atmospheric
carbon dioxide concentrations. Alas, we do not live in libertarian
or anarchist utopia: nation-states exist and the wisdom of their
respective climate policies will determine the fate of humanity.
The emissions trading in China, if properly designed, will lead to
significant efficiency benefits from an economic standpoint and
lead towards a lower carbon future — the impacts of Chinese capand-trade will eclipse in magnitude any single corporate sustainability initiative (which inherently ignores optimizing market
efficiency). Undoubtedly, China’s commitment to a market-based
solution to climate change can teach us all a lesson, especially the
U.S. (whose Senate somehow still does not believe in anthropogenic climate change, based on its recent scientifically-illiterate
vote on the Keystone XL Pipeline amendment). When future generations look back at how we resolve the most urgent environmental crisis faced by our species right now, it is ultimately the
citizen activists - who are risking arrest to speak out and protest
for systematic change in a country not known for its free speech
protection - who will have made history.
Chen, K. & Reklev, S. (2014, August 31). China’s carbon market to start in 2016 official. Retrieved from http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/08/31/china-carbontrading-idUSL3N0R107420140831
25
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